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Economic development and rapid changes in technology have 
considerable impact on higher education in China. To prepare 
skilled highly-educated workforce and meet the demand for research 
development and productivity, higher education institutions in China 
are under a great pressure of adapting and implementing organizational 
change (Li et al., 2012).[20] This paper starts with an overview of the 
higher educational transformations in China in the past decades. Then the 
author assesses the shared governance practice in the U.S. and discusses 
the potential and limitations for China to adopt shared governance in the 
near future.
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1. Introduction
Since the transformation from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy under the open-door policy in the 1980s, the Chinese higher 
education system has shifted from a completely top-
down centralized system to a more locally control system 
after several governance reforms, including the Decision 
on the Reform of the Educational System in 1985 and 
the Outline for Education Reform and Development in 
1993. In 1998, the Chinese government issued the Higher 
Education Law which stipulated the legal status of higher 
education institutions. The university president held 
more accountable for the institutional policy making and 
strategic planning. Higher education institutions (HEIs) 
were authorized with considerably more governance 
autonomy, including proposing enrollment plan, making 
changes in program offerings and curricula design, 
conducting research, personnel recruitment and selection, 
performance evaluation and rewards of faculty and staff, 
facilities management, and allocation of government 
funds and donations.
Meanwhile, HEIs doesn’t receive 100 percent of 
funding from the Ministry of Education any longer. 
Parts of the funding come from national and local 
provinces; others from donations from alumni and 
society, student tuition and fees, research contracts, 
etc. As research contracts share more percentages in 
the source of institutional funding and faculty research 
and their products become more representative of an 
institution’s reputation, the status of faculty has increased. 
There’s need for increasing faculty voice in institutional 
governance to guide the healthy growth of institutions.
Rapid economic development and technology change 
the demands in the labor market which creates new 
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challenges to prepare students for success and increases 
accountability of HEIs in China. Faced with international 
competition, some observers argued that governance 
reform in HEIs, including decentralization and increasing 
faculty’s involvement and academic freedom is the key 
for escalating higher education quality.
The launch of the South University of Science and 
Technology of China (SUSTC) in 2007 is an important 
pilot of the governance reform in HEIs for decentralization 
and shared governance in China. The institution was 
funded by the municipal of Shenzhen, a special economic 
zone city in southern China, in hopes of performing 
institutional administrative affairs independently. SUSTC 
involved faculty to implement its own college admission 
process in which students can choose not to take the 
national college entrance examination. The institution 
issued its own diploma and had the autonomy to develop 
and execute its own strategic plan and university policy. 
Faculty in SUSTC enjoy autonomy in areas such as the 
choice of teaching language, curriculum design and 
student admission. However, SUSTC was blocked from 
accreditation and considered illegitimate as payback for 
the autonomy. 
Under great external pressure, SUSTC reached a 
compromise with the Ministry of Education to count 
national entrance exam for 60 percent. In 2013, one year 
after it was accredited by the Ministry of Education, the 
University Party Committee was established in SUSTC. 
Later, a new president stepped up and changed some 
of the university policies, including financial aid plan 
to be aligned with the central government’s rules and 
regulations. However, the failure of governance reform 
of SUSTC didn’t stop the exploration of restructuring 
university systems. Wide-raging discussions have taken 
place about faculty involvement and the exercise of 
academic power, reflecting the HEIs’ impulse for change. 
There are four types of systematic governance modes 
in higher education proposed by Capano (2011)[5]: 
Hierarchical mode: The government imposes goals 
and methods on higher education institutions leaving 
little procedural or substantial autonomy—substantial 
determination of student admission numbers and 
national academic level; direct regulation on teaching 
and research outcomes, earmarked funding, direct 
budget assignation.
Procedural mode: The government exerts strict 
national rules with substantial institutional autonomy 
– detailed national regulation of personnel recruitment 
and student admission process; control in curricula 
design; specific rules in budget assignation; strict 
regulation on internal governance.
Steering-at-a-distance mode: The government 
focuses  on se t t ing  col lec t ive  objec t ives  and 
implementing strategies with incentives to encourage 
compliance but leaves stakeholders freedom to 
choose methods to reach the goals—the government 
provides clear systematic goals, financial incentives 
and constraints, soft rules and comparative evaluation 
to influence stakeholders in institutions. Institutions 
enjoy the autonomy to consider options and determine 
their own development strategies. It’s assumed that 
government and individual institutions can both 
demonstrate accountability and act rationally.
Self-governance mode: Government leaves 
complete freedom to policy making in higher education 
institutions but reserves the right to intervene when 
necessary. The operation of institutions is market-
driven and influenced by the institutionalization of 
relations between participants.
In a long term, higher education system in China was 
a good example of hierarchical governance, characterized 
by strictly top-down management practices and limited 
procedural or substantial autonomy. For example, in the 
early years, the central government imposed its goals of 
increasing higher education participation. Funding was 
assigned to institutions based on systematic national 
missions determined by the government with little 
connection to quality assessment.  Then the governance 
reform in the late 90s shifted the hierarchical mode to 
the other traditional governance mode—procedural 
governance. Institutions have some freedom to choose 
their own goals and make substantial decisions though 
they are required to follow the rigid procedural regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Education. 
In the past decade, China has undergone rapid 
economic growth in a catch-up mode. Public expenditure 
on Research and Development (R&D) has increased 
dramatically and higher education institutions have 
been playing a critical role in the country’s capability of 
expanding innovation. Technology has great influence 
on the speed of change in the society, including higher 
education. To keep up the pace in a considerably 
competitive environment, a shift in higher education 
system governance becomes necessary. According to 
Institutional Theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983),[7] 
organizations respond and adapt to pressures in their 
environment towards isomorphism so that they will 
appear legitimate. Increasing globalization results in 
rapid exchange of information, interaction of values 
and confluence of culture which allow international 
comparisons and imitation of education system. The 
U.S. higher education system which develops a large 
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number of prestigious universities has been leading the 
global competition. Private universities in the U.S. are 
self-governing bodies that enjoy complete freedom in 
determining their own institutional goals and means. Most 
public universities are impacted by the policy priorities set 
by the state central government though they preserve the 
freedom of choosing method for reaching them. Decision 
making of internal authorities in colleges and universities 
can be steered through financial incentives and negotiated 
contracts provided by the central government. Though 
the private institutions and public institutions differ 
in the level of governmental specification of the goals 
to be achieved, as classified by Capano (2011),[5] they 
typically share the same “best practice”, called shared 
governance. The majority of the colleges and universities 
in the U.S. honor the process of shared governance, 
which collaboratively engage faculty and other internal 
and external stakeholders in institution decision-making 
and priority setting. After the massive expansion, HEIs 
in China set the goal of building world-class universities 
and scaling up research and innovation activities. There 
has been a tendency to emulate top universities in the U.S. 
as a convenient source of practice. Faculty at the most 
prestigious colleges and universities in the U.S. enjoyed 
a larger role in institutional governance than those at less 
respected institutions (Gerber, 2014).[10] Many scholars see 
shared governance as a breakthrough to HEI governance 
reform. How likely HEIs in China can resemble the HE 
system in the U.S. to implement shared governance? 
2. Shared Governance in the U.S.
The first colleges in the U.S. were founded by religious 
communities in the colonies to train ministers and leaders 
in other professions. After the Revolutionary War, those 
colonial colleges received direct support from the states 
but enjoyed great independence. The Supreme Court’s 
Dartmouth decision in 1819 limits the intervention power 
from the new federal government on private institutions. 
The enactment of the Morrill Act of 1862, which 
gave each state public land to foster higher education 
(Lingenfelter et.al, 2004),[21] resulted in over seventy land 
grant colleges and universities. The states also established 
publicly owned “flagship universities” all across the 
country. With the resources from the federal government, 
state colleges and universities were expected to provide 
practical education mainly on agriculture and engineering 
along with classical subjects. Though not granted with 
constitutional autonomy, public institutions still operated 
with substantial independence from state control, 
governed by boards (Berdahl, 2014).[2] It allowed public 
institutions to compete with private colleges to attract 
and serve students by implementing different innovative 
strategies promptly. 
In the early history of both public and private higher 
education institutions, legal authority, which is the basis 
for the role of trustees and administration, was generally 
recognized. Presidents and administrative leaders were 
selected and supported by boards of trustees to exercise 
control over all levels of institutional issues (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955).[12] Faculty’s involvement in institutional 
governance is limited to academic issues, such as the 
authority in teaching methods and curriculum design 
(Brinbaum, 2000).[3]  As the professionalism of the 
faculty is escalating in the early 20th century, in 1920, the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP)’s 
Committee on College and University Governance 
emphasized the importance of faculty’s voice in academic 
governance in its first statement. After World War II, the 
academic revolution resulted in faculty’s stronger need of 
participation in overall institutional governance, including 
institutional strategic planning, budgeting, personnel 
selection etc. (Brinbaum, 2000).[3] The 1966 Joint 
Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 
formulated by the AAUP, the American Council on 
Education (ACE) and the Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB), formally 
called for shared governance. The statement legitimated 
the faculty’s role in institutional governance for the first 
time. Since then, many U.S. colleges and universities 
accepted “shared governance” and gradually developed 
a set of practices under which both administrators and 
faculty participate in primary institutional operation 
decisions. The core rationale of shared governance is that 
integrating diverse values and beliefs can achieve quality 
decision.
Higher educational institutions in the U.S. are loosely 
coupled bureaucratic organizations (Weick, 1976).[33] The 
professional nature of faculty creates the professional 
bureaucracy (Hardy, 1990) in which, faculty are assumed 
to enjoy a greater degree of control over their work and 
be capable to influence on institutional governance in a 
decentralized structure.
In the practice of shared governance, research revealed 
that the areas where faculty have influence in institutional 
governance varies. McCormick and Meiners (1988)[25] 
“found that faculty control ranged from as high as of 
97% for decisions concerning academic performance 
and as low as of 7% for decisions concerning long term 
budgetary planning. Other studies suggested that faculty 
have the most influence on curriculum (Brown, 2001;[4] 
Kater & Levin, 2004;[17] Kaplan, 2005; Tierney & Minor, 
2003[31),[16] standards for promotion and tenure (Tierney 
& Minor, 2003 ),[31] faculty evaluation (Kater & Levin, 
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2004; Tierney & Minor, 2003[31]),[17] faculty appointment 
(Kaplan, 2005),[16] and degree offerings (Kaplan, 2005),[16] 
as well as student admissions and graduation (Benjamin 
& Carroll, 1996).[1] However, faculty played the least 
important role in budgeting and resource allocation 
(Dimond, 1991;[8] Brown, 2001;[4] Kissler, 1997;[18] Tierney 
& Minor, 2003),[31] and evaluation of organizational 
leaders (Tierney & Minor, 2003).
Faculty’s attitudes towards shared governance play a 
critical role in the applicability and effectiveness of the 
dual control model. William et al. (1987)[34] collected 
faculty’s attitudes towards shared governance in HEIs of 
US. He found that most faculty considered governance 
was one critical part of their job responsibilities. In the 
US, there’s always strong faculty support for faculty’s 
involvement in institutional governance (e.g., Miller, 
2002;[27] McKnight et al., 2007;[24] Minor, 2003).[28] 
Tierney and Minor (2003)[31] conducted a national study 
with over 3800 participants from more than 750 colleges 
and universities. They found that more than 80 percent 
of faculty believe shared governance is important to an 
institution’s values and identity. However, Minor (2003)[28] 
found that more than 75 percent of faculty at Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) didn’t view 
faculty governance as a critical part to their institution’s 
value and identity. Their commitment to teaching and 
students may negatively affect the ability and desire to 
involve in institutional governance (Jones, 2011).[15] 
During the past  several  decades of practices, 
administrators and faculty have been struggling to 
understand what shared governance is, how it works and 
whether it actually works. Tierney and Minor (2003)
[31] revealed that without a formal shared governance 
structure to involve faculty in decision making, even 
though the faculty were told that their opinions were 
valued, their voice were seldom reflected or considered in 
actual decision making process. When the faculty’s voice 
and concerns were ignored in decision making, it creates 
a climate of us-versus-them dynamics in HEIs that may 
result in conflicts and institutional dysfunction (Redmond, 
2007).[29]
Cunningham (2008)[6] examined the impact of share 
governance on the institution financial performance by 
investigating the relationship between the overall strength 
of faculty governance measured by the 1971 AAUP data 
and institution’s endowment per students. The findings 
showed that shared governance had a positive impact 
on institutional financial performance. Brown (2001)[4] 
investigated the relationship between faculty participation 
in institutional decision and institution performance and 
suggested that whether the impact of faculty participation 
is good or bad depended on the decision-making types. He 
utilized three measures as the indicators for institutional 
performance: the SAT scores of incoming students, 
institution’s average faculty salary, and the institution 
overall quality measured on Gourman index.  His findings 
indicated that greater faculty participation in decision 
regarding appointment and tenure had a positive influence 
on all three performance indicators. Faculty’s participation 
in general administrative decisions such as facilities 
management, selection of president had a negative impact 
on all three indicators of institutional performance. 
Faculty participation in curriculum decision had no impact 
on institutional performance.
Some researchers claimed that to make shared 
governance effective, there must be sufficiently high 
levels of trust and communication between administrators 
and faculty (Jones, 2011; Miller, 2002[27])[15] and adequate 
rewards and incentives for faculty who participate in 
shared governance (Williams et al., 1987).[34]   
Recently, shared governance has been facing with 
criticisms. Faculty involvement in governance is criticized 
for slowing down the decision-making process. The key 
stakeholders in the academic governance—administration 
and faculty have different priority and see the issues 
from distinct perspectives. Administration focuses more 
on the efficiency while faculty are more concerned with 
academic values. The shared responsibility typically 
resulting in lengthy discussions between the two parties 
may lead to unresponsiveness. The institutions may 
not be able to react to the rapid changes in the external 
environment promptly. 
Shared governance in the higher education of 
US is “eroded by universities’ rapidly increasingly 
organizational complexity and entrepreneurialism (Meyer, 
2015, p.1)[26]” which leads to intensified conflicts between 
faculty and administrators and centralization of authority 
and decision-making. Some institutions revise governance 
systems to corporate governance that excludes faculty 
voice to respond more quickly to market needs. They 
adopt practices that value the entrepreneurial character 
and make strategic plans linked to markets and society. 
Leadership and leadership style become critical to 
governance effectiveness (Schuster et al., 1994).[30] 
3. Can China Replicate the U.S. Shared Gov-
ernance Model?
According to the structural contingency theory, 
there’s no single, effective structure for all organizations 
(Donaldson, 1999).[9] HEIs must take many factors into 
consideration when adapting to a new environment; such 
factors include political environment, original structure, 
local rules and regulations, social and culture values, 
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as well as the characteristics of administrators, faculty 
and staff. The governing structure in HEIs of China is 
composed of binary governing bodies – the Communist 
Party of China University Committee and the University 
Administration Committee with dual leaderships. 
The organizational structure of Chinese colleges and 
universities begins at the top with the two parallel 
executive chief officers, President and Party Secretary 
who are both government officials, usually appointed by 
the Mistry of Education and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). 
The boundaries of the decision making authority 
be tween  the  po l i t i c a l  body  and  the  academic 
administration body is vaguely defined (Wang, 2010).
[32] The President is the chief executive officer for 
academics under the leadership of the University Party 
Committee. The Party Secretary has the responsibilities to 
ensure that the institution follows the Party Committee’s 
guidelines and to deliver political education to faculty, 
administrators, staffs and students. The Party Secretary 
leads a Standing Party Committee of which the members 
hold the key administrative leadership positions in 
the HEIs (Han, 1993).[11] At each academic unit of the 
hierarchical structure, a Party Branch Secretary is placed 
parallel to Dean/Department Chair who has a supervisory 
role at school or department levels (Wang, 2010).[32] 
Usually, the dean or the chair has more power than the 
Party Branch Secretary in the decision making (Jiang & 
Wei, 2011).[13]  
Under the highly centralized system with dual 
leadership, governance in HEIs of China is more complex 
than any institutions in the US. The two countries have 
totally distinct higher education governance systems. If 
shared governance is adopted in China, the institutional 
governance will be the divided responsibility among 
administration, faculty and political body for decision 
making. Like the faculty in public institutions in the 
U.S., the faculty in China typically hold values that 
are not necessarily well aligned with those required by 
the central government or institutional administration. 
For example, the faculty may value academic freedom 
and independence while the Communist Party of China 
University Committee has the accountability to steer 
overall direction to ensure the operations are in accordance 
to regulations and laws. It may not be easy for faculty 
to learn how to find their appropriate places in the dual 
governance system to share the governing responsibilities. 
Competing interests and conflicts are likely to result in 
controversial disputes and endless debates. 
Another possible situation is that there is no debate 
at all – the political body exercises influence over 
the decision-making process centrally. Although the 
HEIs today enjoy more autonomy of academic and 
administrative control, the Ministry of Education provides 
specific guidelines on missions and goals, strategic 
planning, admissions, enrollment, research, curriculum 
design and campus activities. The political body, typically 
empowered with stronger authority, are critical part of 
HEIs to make sure administration and faculty follow 
the procedural rules. When SUSTC was first funded, 
there was no CCP played a role in the governance. 
The governance structure was composed of the Board 
of Trustees, Administrative Committee and Academic 
Committee in which administrators and faculty both 
enjoyed relatively high autonomy. There was plenty of 
room for bottom-up decision-making. After CCP joined 
the SUSTC in 2014, a number of rules, policies and 
strategies were overwritten. The institutional governance 
of SUSTC shifted towards greater centralization. 
One of the critical factors for the prevalence of shared 
governance in the US is that the academic organizations 
are loosely coupled which allows sub-system breakdown 
without damaging the entire organization (Weick, 1976)
[33] when an inaccurate decision is made and executed. 
Administrators and faculty who are involved in the 
decision making probably have less accountability 
pressure. Whereas administrators and faculty in HEIs of 
China who work in a centralized system have to be more 
cautious to make any change to prevent any element 
misfiring and spreading across subcomponents. The 
centralized system exerts a pressure to hold administrators 
and faculty accountable in the institutional governance.
Faculty overwork is also an important factor that 
prevents the prevalence of shared governance (Leach, 
2008). [19] After  the governance reform in 1998, 
accompanied by increased autonomy in academic 
areas, faculty and academic staff in HEIs of China are 
overwhelmed with curriculum design, course preparation, 
research activities (OECD). In the context of competitive 
research funding and tenure positions, faculty have been 
too overloaded to involve in institutional governance.    
In fact, shared governance was not a new concept 
to HEIs in China. Shared governance was introduced 
to China as early as the late 1910s when Yuanpei Cai 
became the president of Peking University. Following 
the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, HEIs in China gradually abandoned 
the model of shared governance, replacing with “the 
President Responsibility System under the Leadership 
of Party Committees in Universities and Colleges” (Liu, 
2015).[22] Today, centralized system in HEI governance 
in China has deeply influenced organizational culture 
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in the form of organizational structure (hierarchy) and 
power structure (who makes the decisions and how 
widely spread is power) identified by Gerry Johnson 
(1988).[14] Administrators and faculty are accustomed 
to and dependent on central planning, central funding 
and central policymaking, the outcomes of which, in 
general, are positive so far. Change to shared governance 
will be difficult because the organizational cultures and 
the centralized structure often reflect the “imprint” of a 
particular time in history persistently despite subsequent 
environment changes (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013).[23]
Shared governance caught a lot of attention in higher 
education in the past decade. It seems to be a fad borrowed 
from the US higher education world as “quick-fix” to 
the escalated problems resulted from highly centralized 
education system. Brinbaum (2000)[3] pointed out that 
when a management fad is introduced and advocated, 
success stories are highlighted. “The narrative focuses 
on claimed benefits; little attention is given to potential 
costs” (p.6). That is exactly what happened in HEIs in 
China these days. While shared governance has been 
practiced in the US for a long time, and was promoted by 
scholars recently in China, with full consideration of the 
limitations discussed above, shared governance has little 
likelihood to be applied to the HEIs in the near future in 
China.
4. Conclusion
Given the unique organizational structure, culture and 
academic climate of higher education system in China 
as well as the weakness of shared governance practice, 
there’s small likelihood that shared governance will be 
executed in China.
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